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REFUGEE CRISIS AND MIGRATIONS AT THE GATES OF 
EUROPE: DETERRITORIALITY, EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND 
EXTERNALIZATION OF BORDER CONTROLS
Alejandro DEL VALLE-GÁLVEZ1
I. - INTRODUCTION. II. - THE BORDERS AND GATES OF EUROPE. III. - 
VULNERABILITY OF THE EUROPEAN BORDERS? IV.-‘EXTERNALIZATION’, 
‘EXTRATERRITORIALITY’ AND ‘DETERRITORIALITY’ OF MIGRATION 
CONTROL. V. - CONCLUSIONS
ABSTRACT: The refugee crisis has shaped a new perception of the migration reality in Europe. 
The ramifications of its impact on European integration are visible and enduring. The EU’s respon-
se has included a certain strategic perspective, albeit weighed down by an excess of eurocentrism 
and a security perception that does not take third countries’ interests into balanced account. The ma-
jor economic effort being made supports a far-reaching strategy, only now beginning to be outlined, 
to promote economic development in the countries of origin and transit of migrants. Additionally, 
issues such as the monitoring of respect for migrants’ human rights have not yet been suitably glo-
bally defined in this strategy.
Although the behaviour and response capacity of the EU and its Member States can be assessed 
in different ways, the truth is that the migration debate has decisively swayed a block of countries 
that are openly reluctant to engage in intra-European solidarity and accept the new realities and 
responsibilities entailed by the refugees already present and yet to come to Europe. This position 
is very negative in the medium and long term, since, as noted, the crisis has also underscored the 
permanence of migration trends and flows and the consolidation of the routes or gates of entry to 
Europe.
This contribution considers the vulnerability of the European borders designed and in operation 
in the Schengen Area. The internal borders were the most affected at the start of the migration crisis 
and are likely to be marked by current regulatory changes, which tend to allow exceptionality as 
a relatively common occurrence in the European ‘federal’ area of free movement. Nevertheless, 
the resilience of this system of the absence of internal border controls in the ‘federal’ area of free 
movement is undeniable.
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The impact on the EU’s external borders has been even greater, as it has shown once and for all 
that, more than fragile or vulnerable, some border controls, such as the sea border ones, are not 
practicable, especially those on Europe’s southern sea borders.
It is precisely this infeasibility of border control in marine areas that leads to the accentuation of 
certain trends on Europe’s external borders, such as the externalization of migration controls. New 
regulatory and strategic planning developments confirm this trend, as well as the current concern 
for deploying an integrated external border management system.
With regard to the phenomenon known as the ‘externalization’ of migration controls, the litera-
ture considers it to refer to EU actions aimed at reducing, sorting and controlling migration flows 
with the consent of third states in relations that are, by definition, asymmetrical. This article has 
addressed the different situations that arise, highlighting the advisability of differentiating between 
externalizing migration policy, on the one hand, and extraterritorial action concerning migration 
control, on the other.
In search of greater conceptual accuracy, the term ‘deterritoriality’ has been used, as it is more 
neutral than the other terms mentioned insofar as it evokes the idea of positioning outside the te-
rritory certain border control and migration policy functions, to be carried out by other states or 
by the state itself. Since these are situations and actions linked to migration and border control, 
they should be conceptually situated outside the territory; the deterritoriality option hypothetically 
makes it possible to encompass both the externalization and the extraterritoriality of border control 
functions concerning migration.
To this end, this article has focused on the various notions and activities that might be discussed 
in relation to the ‘externalization’ and the ‘extraterritoriality’ of migration controls and border func-
tions, terms that, in sum, refer to migration control and management activities outside the territory, 
carried out by public officials of the EU states or by third states.
On the one hand, externalization is considered to refer to the management and control of mi-
gration flows, the activities of adopting agreements, programmes, action plans and measures to 
encourage third states to monitor their own borders and migration flows in order to control, restrict 
or impede physical access to the territory of the EU states, accepting the placement in their territory, 
or the rejection, of refugees and migrants from other states. It does not involve the presence of or 
direct exercise of control activities by public officials of the EU Member States. In fact, outside 
European territory it is highly debatable that states are strictly performing border control functions, 
as it is an area that may more accurately fall within the more generic field of migration flow control 
linked to migration policy and European external action. 
On the other hand, extraterritorialization is understood to entail the performance of border con-
trol functions by states themselves outside their own territory. This case should involve the presence 
of or exercise by Member State public officials of some (effective) border control activities or func-
tions in areas without state jurisdiction or in the territory of third states, with their consent. 
We are witnessing a change in the very concept of border in this post-globalization era, in which 
certain functions are offshored and systematically placed outside a state’s territory and checkpoints. 
However, territorial and extraterritorial actions must be differentiated from those occurring as part 
of external actions in or with third states for the purposes of migration policy and the control of 
migration flows. 
The reality is that a new border space south and east of the Mediterranean has been configured for 
migratory flows, which needs a new policy of external borders for these areas. Therefore, we must 
reflect on new frontier spaces, with new concepts and approaches to the border that provide other 
parameters of action towards migratory flows and external controls.
Today, the Union needs new instruments and concepts for these new realities, especially so as not 
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to lose sight of the fact that, when it comes to tackling crises such as those related to migration and 
the rights of foreigners approaching or entering its territory and jurisdiction, Europe is a rational 
construct entailing a project for civilizational progress. As such, it must permanently incorporate 
its values and respect for human rights in all its policies, regulatory measures and actions with 
foreigners and third states, both on its own external borders and beyond them. This is essential for 
the identity and objectives of the European integration, and for the projection of the EU security, 
solidarity and values in accordance with the International and European Human Rights Law.
KEYWORDS: European Union, immigration, refugees, asylum, European values, border controls, 
immigration controls, migration policy, borders, internal borders, external borders, Frontex, mariti-
me immigration, externalization, extraterritoriality, deterritoriality, human rights
CRISIS DE REFUGIADOS Y MIGRACIONES EN LAS PUERTAS DE EUROPA: 
DESTERRITORIALIDAD, EXTRATERRITORIALIDAD Y EXTERNALIZACIÓN DE 
CONTROLES FRONTERIZOS
RESUMEN: La crisis de los refugiados ha conformado en Europa una nueva percepción de la rea-
lidad migratoria. Las ramificaciones de sus impactos en la construcción europea son visibles y du-
raderas. La reacción de la UE ha tenido cierta perspectiva estratégica, aunque lastrada por un exceso 
de eurocentrismo y de percepción securitaria, que no tiene en cuenta equilibradamente los intereses 
de los países terceros. El gran esfuerzo económico que se está realizando sostiene una estrategia 
de largo alcance que sólo ahora empieza a esbozarse, para fomentar el desarrollo económico en los 
países de origen y tránsito de la emigración. Por otra parte, cuestiones como las de vigilancia del 
respeto de derechos humanos de los inmigrantes aún están por perfilarse adecuadamente de manera 
global en esta estrategia.
Aunque podemos hacer diferentes valoraciones del comportamiento y capacidad de reacción de 
la UE y sus Estados, lo cierto es que el debate migratorio ha decantado decididamente un bloque 
de países abiertamente reacios a la solidaridad intraeuropea, y a asumir las nuevas realidades y 
cargas que suponen los refugiados presentes y por venir a Europa. Esta perspectiva es muy negativa 
a medio y largo plazo, ya que, como hemos visto, la crisis también revela la permanencia de las 
corrientes y flujos migratorios, y la consolidación de los vías o Puertas de entrada a Europa.
Hemos considerado en el trabajo la vulnerabilidad de las fronteras europeas diseñadas y en fun-
cionamiento en el Área Schengen. Las fronteras interiores fueron las más impactadas al comienzo 
de la crisis migratoria, y probablemente van a quedar marcadas por los cambios normativos en 
curso, que tienden a admitir la excepcionalidad como hecho relativamente común en el espacio ‘fe-
deral’ de libre circulación europeo. Pese a todo, la capacidad de resiliencia de este sistema de ausen-
cia de controles fronterizos interiores en el espacio ‘federal’ de libre circulación, es incontestable.
El impacto en las fronteras europeas exteriores ha sido aún mayor, ya que se ha puesto de relieve 
en nuestra opinión definitivamente que, más que frágiles o vulnerables, ciertos controles fronterizos 
como los marítimos son impracticables, en particular los de las fronteras marítimas meridionales 
europeas.
Precisamente esta inviabilidad del control fronterizo en espacios marítimos es lo que lleva en 
nuestra opinión a acentuar ciertas tendencias en las fronteras exteriores europeas, como las de 
externalización de controles migratorios. Los nuevos desarrollos normativos y de planificación 
estratégica confirman esta tendencia, así como la preocupación actual por desplegar un sistema 
integrado de gestión de fronteras exteriores.
Respecto al fenómeno conocido como de ‘Externalización’ de controles migratorios, la doctrina 
ha venido considerándolo como actuaciones de la UE que buscan reducir, ordenar y controlar los 
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flujos migratorios en anuencia con Estados terceros, en relaciones por definición asimétricas. En 
nuestro trabajo hemos abordado las diferentes situaciones que se plantean, poniendo de relieve la 
conveniencia de diferenciar entre Externalizar las políticas migratorias, por una parte, de la actua-
ción Extraterritorial de control migratorio, por otra parte.
Buscando una mayor precisión conceptual, preferimos utilizar el termino Desterritorialidad, que 
es más neutro que los referidos, al evocar la idea de ubicar fuera del territorio determinadas fun-
ciones de control fronterizo y de políticas migratorias, a desarrollar por otros Estados o por el 
propio Estado. Al tratarse de situaciones y actuaciones vinculadas a las migraciones y a los con-
troles fronterizos, debemos conceptualmente situarnos fuera del territorio; por lo que esta opción 
de Desterritorialidad, permite hipotéticamente abarcar las dos situaciones de Externalización y de 
Extraterritorialidad de las funciones de control fronterizo respecto a las migraciones. Para ello nos 
centramos en las diferentes nociones y actividades que podrían debatirse respecto a la ‘Externali-
zación’, ‘Extraterritorialidad’ de controles migratorios y funciones fronterizas, expresiones que, en 
suma, hacen referencia a actividades de gestión y control migratorio fuera del territorio, llevados a 
cabo por agentes públicos de los Estados UE, o por terceros Estados.
Por una parte, consideramos constituyen Externalización de la gestión y control de flujos migra-
torios, las actividades de adopción de Acuerdos, Programa, Planes y medidas que pretenden que Es-
tados terceros vigilen sus propias fronteras y flujos migratorios, para controlar, restringir o impedir 
el acceso físico al territorio de los Estados UE, asumiendo la localización en su territorio, o el recha-
zo, de refugiados e inmigrantes de otros Estados. Esto no implicaría presencia ni ejercicio directo 
de actividades de control por agentes públicos de los Estados Miembros de la UE. En realidad, fuera 
del territorio europeo es muy discutible que los Estados estén realizando estrictamente funciones de 
control fronterizo, ya que se trata de un ámbito que se encuentra tal vez en el más genérico terreno 
del control de flujos migratorios y vinculado a la política migratoria y a la acción exterior europea.
Por otra parte, entendemos que la actuación Extraterritorialidad supone llevar a cabo funciones 
de control fronterizo por los Estados fuera de su territorio. Aquí debe existir en nuestra opinión pre-
sencia o ejercicio por agentes públicos de los Estados miembros de ciertas actividades o funciones 
de control (efectivo) fronterizo, en espacios sin jurisdicción estatal, o en el territorio de Estados 
terceros, con su acuerdo.
Estamos ante un cambio en la concepción misma de la frontera en esta era pos-globalización, 
donde determinadas funciones se deslocalizan y se sitúan sistemáticamente fuera del territorio y 
los puestos fronterizos de los Estados. Sin embargo, las actuaciones territoriales y extraterritoria-
les deben diferenciarse de las que se producen en actividades de acción exterior en o con terceros 
Estados a fines de política de inmigración y control de flujos migratorios. La realidad es que se ha 
configurado para los flujos migratorios un nuevo espacio fronterizo al sur y este del mediterráneo, 
que necesita una nueva política de fronteras exteriores para este área. Por ello debemos reflexionar 
sobre nuevos espacios e imaginarios fronterizos, con nuevos conceptos y enfoques de la frontera 
que aporten otros parámetros de actuación hacia los flujos migratorios y los controles exteriores.
La Unión necesita hoy instrumentos y conceptos nuevos para estas nuevas realidades, y sobre 
todo para no perder de vista que, a la hora de afrontar crisis como las migratorias y de derechos 
de los extranjeros que se acercan o entran en nuestro territorio y jurisdicción, Europa es una cons-
trucción racional que supone un Proyecto de progreso civilizatorio, y que como tal debe incorporar 
permanentemente sus valores y el respeto de derechos humanos en todas sus políticas, medidas 
normativas y actuaciones con extranjeros y Estados terceros, en sus propias fronteras exteriores y 
más allá de las mismas. Esto es esencial para la identidad y objetivos de la integración, y para la 
proyección de la seguridad, solidaridad y valores de la UE conforme al Derecho internacional y 
europeo de los Derechos Humanos.
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PALABRAS CLAVE: Unión Europea, inmigración, refugiados, asilo, valores de Europa, contro-
les fronterizos, controles migratorios, política migratoria, fronteras, fronteras interiores, fronteras 
exteriores, Frontex, inmigración marítima, externalización, extraterritorialidad, desterritorialidad, 
derechos humanos
CRISE DES RÉFUGIÉS ET MIGRATIONS AUX PORTES DE L’EUROPE: DÉTERRITO-
RIALITÉ, EXTRATERRITORIALITÉ ET EXTERNALISATION DES CONTRÔLES DES 
FRONTIÈRES
RÉSUMÉ : La crise des réfugiés a forgé une nouvelle perception de la réalité de la migration en 
Europe. Les conséquences de ses impacts sur la construction européenne sont visibles et durables. 
La réaction de l’UE a eu une certaine perspective stratégique, bien que pénalisée par un excès de 
perception de l’eurocentrisme et de la sécurité, qui ne tienne pas compte des intérêts des pays tiers. 
Le grand effort économique en cours appuie une stratégie à long terme qui commence seulement à 
être esquissée pour promouvoir le développement économique dans les pays d’origine et de transit 
de l’émigration. D’autre part, des questions telles que la surveillance du respect des droits humains 
des immigrés doivent encore être correctement établies de manière globale dans cette stratégie.
Bien que nous puissions évaluer différemment le comportement et la capacité de réaction de 
l’UE et de ses États, le débat sur l’immigration a décidément décliné en bloc un groupe de pays 
ouvertement réticents à la solidarité intra-européenne et à assumer les nouvelles réalités et les res-
ponsabilités que posent les réfugiés. Cette perspective est très négative à moyen et long terme car, 
comme on l’a vu, la crise révèle également la permanence des courants et des flux migratoires, ainsi 
que la consolidation des routes ou portes d’entrée en Europe.
Nous avons examiné à l’œuvre la vulnérabilité des frontières européennes en fonctionnement 
dans l’espace Schengen. Les frontières intérieures ont été les plus touchées au début de la crise 
migratoire et devraient être modifiées par les propositions réglementaires en cours, qui tendent à 
admettre que l’exceptionnalité est un phénomène relativement courant dans l’espace «fédéral» de 
la libre circulation européenne. Malgré tout, la résilience de ce système d’absence de contrôle aux 
frontières intérieures dans l’espace «fédéral» de libre circulation est incontestable.
L’impact sur les frontières extérieures de l’Europe a été encore plus grand, car il a été clairement 
souligné à notre avis que, plutôt que fragiles ou vulnérables, certains contrôles frontaliers tels que 
les contrôles maritimes sont irréalisables, notamment ceux des frontières maritimes du sud de l’Eu-
rope.
C’est précisément cette impossibilité de contrôler les frontières dans les espaces maritimes qui 
conduit, à notre avis, à accentuer certaines tendances aux frontières extérieures européennes, telles 
que celles de l’externalisation des contrôles migratoires. Les nouveaux développements réglemen-
taires et stratégiques en matière de planification confirment cette tendance, ainsi que la détermina-
tion actuelle de déployer un système intégré de gestion des frontières extérieures.
En ce qui concerne le phénomène appelé «externalisation» des contrôles de l’immigration, la 
doctrine l’a considéré comme une action de l’UE visant à réduire, ordonner et contrôler les flux 
migratoires en accord avec les États tiers, dans des relations asymétriques par définition. Dans notre 
travail, nous avons abordé les différentes situations qui se présentent, en soulignant l’opportunité de 
différencier les politiques migratoires d’externalisation, d’une part, de l’action extraterritoriale de 
contrôle de l’immigration, d’autre part.
À la recherche d’une plus grande précision conceptuelle, nous préférons utiliser le terme Dis-
territorialité, qui est plus neutre que ceux auxquels il est fait référence, lorsqu’il évoque l’idée de 
localiser certaines fonctions de contrôle des frontières et certaines politiques de migration en dehors 
du territoire, à développer par d’autres États ou par l’État lui-même. Lorsque nous traitons des si-
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tuations et des actions liées à la migration et aux contrôles aux frontières, nous devons nous placer 
conceptuellement en dehors du territoire; par conséquent, cette option de déterritorialité permet, de 
manière hypothétique, de couvrir les deux situations d’externalisation et d’extraterritorialité des 
fonctions de contrôle des frontières en matière de migration. Pour cela, nous nous concentrons sur 
les différentes notions et activités pouvant être discutées concernant «l’externalisation», «l’extrate-
rritorialité» des contrôles migratoires et des fonctions des frontières, expressions qui, en bref, dé-
signent des activités de gestion et de contrôle des migrations hors du territoire prises par des agents 
publics des États de l’UE ou par des États tiers.
D’une part, nous considérons que l’externalisation de la gestion et du contrôle des flux migra-
toires constitue une activité d’adoption d’accords, de programmes, de plans et de mesures visant à 
garantir que les États tiers surveillent leurs propres frontières et flux migratoires, afin de contrôler, 
restreindre ou empêcher l’accès physique sur le territoire des États membres de l’UE, en supposant 
que le réfugié et l’immigré en provenance d’autres États sont situés sur leur territoire. Cela n’impli-
querait pas la présence ou l’exercice direct d’activités de contrôle par des agents publics des États 
membres de l’UE. En fait, hors du territoire européen, il est très discutable que les États exercent 
strictement des fonctions de contrôle des frontières, car il s’agit peut-être d’un domaine qui est 
peut-être le domaine le plus générique du contrôle des flux migratoires, plutôt lié à la politique 
migratoire et à l’action exterieure européenne.
D’autre part, nous comprenons que l’action Extraterritorialité implique que les États situés à 
l’extérieur de leur territoire exercent des fonctions de contrôle des frontières. À notre avis, il doit 
exister une présence ou un exercice par des agents publics des États membres de certaines activités 
ou fonctions de contrôle des frontières dans les espaces en dehors de la juridiction de l’État ou sur 
le territoire d’États tiers, avec l’accord de ces derniers.
Nous sommes confrontés à un changement dans la conception même de la frontière en cette 
ère de post-globalisation, où certaines fonctions sont délocalisées et systématiquement situées en 
dehors du territoire et des postes frontières des États. Toutefois, les actions territoriales et extraterri-
toriales doivent être distinguées de celles qui se produisent lors d’activités d’action extérieure dans 
ou avec des États tiers à des fins de politique d’immigration et de contrôle des flux migratoires. La 
réalité est qu’un nouvel espace-frontière au sud et à l’est de la Méditerranée a été configuré pour 
les flux migratoires, ce qui nécessite une nouvelle politique de frontières extérieures pour cette 
zone. Par conséquent, nous devons réfléchir sur de nouveaux espaces frontières, avec de nouveaux 
concepts et approches de la frontière qui fournissent d’autres paramètres d’action en matière de flux 
migratoires et de contrôles externes.
Aujourd’hui, l’Union a besoin de nouveaux instruments et concepts pour ces nouvelles réalités, 
et, surtout, pour ne pas perdre de vue le fait que face aux crises telles que les migrations et les 
droits des étrangers qui s’approchent de notre territoire ou y entrent, l’Europe est une construction 
rationnelle qui implique un projet de progrès civilisationnel. En tant que tel, l’Europe doit intégrer 
de manière permanente ses valeurs et le respect des droits de l’homme dans toutes ses politiques, 
mesures réglementaires et actions auprès des étrangers et des États tiers, à ses frontières extérieures 
et au-delà. Cela est essentiel pour l’identité et les objectifs de l’intégration, ainsi que pour la pro-
jection de la sécurité, de la solidarité et des valeurs de l’UE conformément au droit international et 
européen des droits de l’homme.
MOTS-CLÉ: Union européenne, immigration, réfugiés, asile, valeurs européennes, contrôles aux 
frontières, contrôles migratoires, politique d’immigration, frontières, frontières intérieures, fron-
tières extérieures, Frontex, immigration maritime, externalisation, extraterritorialité, déterritoria-
lité, droits de l’homme
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I. INTRODUCTION
The so-called refugee crisis of  2015 has muddled many aspects of  Euro-
pean integration. It is not just a matter of  migration policy or the reception 
of  asylum seekers, but of  numerous aspects linked to the very essence and 
nature of  the Union and of  European integration. European values themsel-
ves are at stake when it comes to tackling the challenges posed by current and 
future migratory pressure towards Europe.2
This article will assess the impact of  the 2015 refugee crisis on the Euro-
pean system of  internal and external borders and the new aspects of  migra-
tion control at the external borders, which go beyond the areas under state 
sovereignty or jurisdiction.
To this end, it will analyse (II) the structure of  the European ‘federal’ area 
of  free movement of  persons and its border system, in force since 1995. The 
analysis of  the crisis, its effects and the EU’s response will show that this spe-
cific crisis falls within a framework of  migration flows and migratory pressu-
re whose access routes to Europe are well known and are determined by the 
migration paths referred to here as the gates of  Europe with the neighbouring 
states of  Turkey, Morocco and Libya.
It will also examine the situation of  the internal and external borders 
following the crisis and present and future migration challenges (III). Spe-
cifically, it will analyse the obstacles to free movement and the status of  the 
external borders as migration control evolves. In this regard, it will assess 
the problems of  migration by sea and the current concern to implement and 
develop an Integrated External Border Management System.
Part IV will focus on the externalization of  migration policy and controls. 
It will review the various situations and propose classifying the set of  expe-
riences, norms and practices carried out beyond state jurisdiction and the 
EU’s external action as ‘deterritorialization’. The author will share his view 
regarding the advisability of  differentiating between externalizing migration 
policies to third states and extraterritorial action for border migration con-
trol. The conclusions (V) will recap the main takeaways.
2 For a previous analysis of  these issues, Del Valle GálVez, A. “Unión Europea, crisis de 
refugiados y limes imperii”, Revista General de Derecho Europeo 38, 2016, and “Los refugiados, las 
fronteras exteriores y la evolución del concepto de frontera internacional”, Revista de Derecho 
Comunitario Europeo, Year No. 20, 55, 2016, p. 759.
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II. THE BORDERS AND GATES OF EUROPE
1. SCHENGEN, INTERNAL BORDERS AND EXTERNAL BORDERS
The function of  borders as a place for the control of  goods and persons 
plays a decisive role in the process of  European integration as it determines 
both the movement of  goods and the mobility of  people. Historically, this 
function of  controlling people has been fulfilled at the border itself  or at 
points near the dividing line. However, the European integration process has 
wrought significant changes in this border control function, primarily due to 
the progress made on economic and political integration. The creation of  a 
unified economic area in the continental territories of  the EU Member States 
has given rise to the need for functional simplification of  the rules governing 
the internal movement of  goods and people of  any nationality in this com-
mon economic area.
This economic vector of  functional unification of  the territories of  the 
states participating in the integration was amongst the powerful factors lea-
ding to the Schengen Agreements of  1985 and 1990 and responsible for the 
entry into force, in 1995, of  the Schengen Implementing Convention — sub-
sequently integrated into EU law by the Treaty of  Amsterdam in 1997 — 
establishing homogeneous systems for controlling movement into and out 
of  the ‘federal’ internal territory. It is undeniably a new historical experience 
of  territorial coexistence for European states and an authentic evolution of  
the classical international border concept and models, resulting in the intro-
duction of  a distinction between ‘internal borders’ and ‘external borders’ in 
European states.3
In short, it consolidated the reality of  what has come to be known as the 
border-free Europe : “Europe without borders” a term that actually refers to a terri-
tory with no controls at the land, sea and airport borders between Member States 
and thus elides the term control. Indeed, legally speaking, a more accurate term 
would be a Europe free of  internal border controls. The achievement of  Europe’s 
new internal border model, implemented in 1997, had a solid legal foundation: 
3 See our Studies “La refundación de la libre circulación de personas, Tercer Pilar y Schengen: 
el espacio europeo de libertad, seguridad y justicia”, 3 Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo , 
nº 3, 1998, pp. 41-ss; “Las fronteras de la Unión - El modelo europeo de fronteras”, 12 Revista 
de Derecho Comunitario Europeo,  12, 2002, p. 299; “Control de Fronteras y Unión Europea”, 7 
Anuario de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid 7, 2003, p. 67, at 72 et seq.
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the definition of  the single market itself  since 1986 as an “area without internal 
frontiers in which the free movement of  goods, persons, services and capital is ensured”(to-
day, Article 26 TFEU)
The TEU and TFEU currently in force include a provision that enshrines 
in primary law the functionalist need for regulation of  the free movement of  
persons in the area or unified economic territory, clearly differentiating be-
tween internal and external borders.
Under the TFEU, the European internal border system has the clear and 
powerful aim of  eliminating controls and, therefore, establishing free move-
ment in a ‘federalized’ territory free of  border control. Article 77 TFEU, in the 
Chapter on Policies on Border Checks, Asylum and Immigration of  the Title 
on the Area of  Freedom, Security and Justice, provides:
1. The Union shall develop a policy with a view to: 
(a) ensuring the absence of  any controls on persons, whatever their nationa-
lity, when crossing internal borders’.
This provision was drafted with the explicit aim of  encompassing all in-
ternal border-control situations (‘ensuring’, ‘absence of  any’, ‘whatever their 
nationality’), establishing a clear mandate with no room for divergent inter-
pretations regarding the obligatoriness for states of  not implementing border 
controls for people. 
This system is complemented by the external border system, with the ne-
cessary controls due to the elimination of  all types of  controls at the internal 
borders between states. Article 77 TFEU further provides:
1. The Union shall develop a policy with a view to:
(b) carrying out checks on persons and efficient monitoring of  the crossing 
of  external borders.
Thus, the Treaty regulates external border crossings with less detail than 
internal border crossings: it is necessary to carry out checks on persons and, 
also, monitor external border crossing; moreover, this monitoring must be 
efficient. However, the term ‘efficient’ is difficult to pin down legally and, thus, 
calls for subsequent assessment, probably of  a political nature. 
However, parallel to the elimination of  the internal border controls, the 
Treaty clearly establishes the need to maintain the checks at Europe’s external 
borders. Hence, the permanent nature of  the institutional and legal construc-
tion of  Europe’s external borders and of  the ensuing need for integrated ma-
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nagement (Article 77(1)(c)), which will inevitably lead to the gradual reinforce-
ment and development of  the European border model.
These primary law objectives and regulation endow the Union’s external 
borders with very special characteristics and properties and make them an 
evolving and fundamental construct inherent to European integration.
One of  the most impressive achievements of  European integration is pre-
cisely the development of  its own border model, whereby the function of  bor-
der control has been adapted to the reality of  integration and the Schengen 
Area through the peculiar reorganization of  the public power functions of  
monitoring and controlling the borders between Member States. Thus, throu-
gh its regulation under the Treaty of  Amsterdam, in force since 1999, the 
European border model already transformed the traditional concept of  border 
by eliminating internal border controls, with the correlative security measures, 
and undertaking innovations in international law, such as the generalization of  
‘hot’ pursuit on land.4
In this context, the analogy of  the EU as a political entity with some attri-
butes similar to those of  a state ideally requires the international integration 
organization to have the elements of  a state, namely: nationals (European 
citizens); a common immigration law (its own set of  rules regulating access 
to, stays in and exit from EU territory); and a territory delimited by borders 
where its main powers are exercised. At the same time, the nascent political 
entity must have a border policy for common control and relations with nei-
ghbouring countries.
2. THE 2015 REFUGEE CRISIS AND MIGRATION TO EUROPE
During the years 2015 and 2016, millions of  people came to Europe as 
part of  a phenomenon mainly caused by the civil war in Syria. It came to be 
known as the refugee crisis, and it overwhelmed all of  Europe’s external border 
control systems.
In principle, the crisis was caused by the historical confluence of  various 
factors, including the consequences of  the Arab springs in countries such as 
Tunisia, the effects of  the intervention and war in Libya, and the Syrian civil 
war.
However, in a context of  a progressive increase in the arrival of  migrants 
to Europe’s borders, the crisis decisively exposed the reality of  migration to 
4 These ideas are discussed in ‘Las fronteras de la Unión…’, supra note 3, Ibid.
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Europe as a structural component of  its existence from here on out. In this 
order of  ideas, the Commission considers that migratory pressure is, and will 
continue to be, the new normal for the EU5  in the medium and long term. 
This refers to the highly likely continued existence of  migratory pressure 
or the massive arrival of  displaced persons, who, due to crises, conflicts and 
environmental problems, amongst other reasons, may reach European terri-
tories.
In addition to its enormous media impact, this particular crisis has had 
profound consequences for public opinion and European integration itself, 
with all kinds of  repercussions in the European Union and its Member States. 
Of  course, many aspects that now seem to be a consequence of  the crisis 
were already present or in an embryonic state prior to it. With the crisis, they 
have emerged or been called into question and thus need to be discussed and 
addressed legally, politically and institutionally.
A brief  overview of  some of  the issues that, in the author’s view, are the 
main effects of  the refugee crisis could be instructive.6
First, there is a terminological problem related to the use of  varied ter-
ms, which the media often treat as synonyms: immigrants, refugees, asylum 
seekers, people who have ‘fled’, displaced persons, etc. Indeed, the crisis has 
exposed the conceptual confusion surrounding migration, as witnessed by the 
interchangeable use of  the terms ‘refugee/migrant’, which, in turn, are con-
fused with the term ‘asylum seekers’. The migratory reality has led to the loss 
of  the specific reference of  refugees as defined under the Geneva Conven-
tion. This traditional conceptual category, well regulated under international 
law and in the Member State’s respective legal systems, is today dealt with di-
ffusely, as a large variety of  situations, ranging from economic or environmen-
tal refugees to subsidiary protection, asylum seekers or mass displacements of  
populations, have been cast as humanitarian conditions.
In this context, the European regulatory system for the asylum and refu-
gee procedure, known as the Dublin system, has been strongly questioned, as 
it places the main responsibility on the applicants’ state of  entry into the EU, 
which invariably places a larger economic and procedural burden on external 
5 External migratory pressure is the “new normal” both for the EU and for partner countries, COM(2016) 
385 final, 7 June 2016, at 6.
6 See the author’s aforementioned articles, “Unión Europea, crisis…” and “Los refugia-
dos…”, supra note 2.
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border states (Italy, Greece and Spain). The Commission has proposed adap-
ting the Dublin asylum claim-processing system with a corrective distribution 
key, amongst other measures.7
At the same time, the system devised for the immediate reception and hos-
ting during the refugee crisis, known as ‘hotspots’, does not seem to have been 
acceptably implemented. The hotspots, or immigrant identification centres in 
Greece and Italy, have been widely criticized for their tenuous respect for the 
human rights of  the foreigners at the centres. Their management shows that 
the systems for reception and registration upon arrival deployed at the hots-
pots in both Greece and Italy have been clearly insufficient8 and require better 
coordination of  agencies and appropriate regulation.9
Of  course, more careful consideration of  the concepts and classification 
of  the situations of  foreigners arriving in Europe is certainly needed, as the 
concepts are linked to and determine specific legal statuses, which, in turn, de-
termine the different rights and obligations of  people in European territories.
Additionally, one key aspect for the European experience of  integration by 
means of  the EU is the free movement of  goods and persons in the ‘federal’ 
area of  free movement that the Schengen Area establishes between 22 EU 
states and 4 non-EU states (Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and Liechtenstein). 
With the refugee crisis, the essential issues linked to the EU’s internal mar-
ket, with its free movement, Schengen Area and internal and external 
borders, have been subject to considerable debate and a troubling political 
questioning, with numerous requests to re-establish control at some internal 
borders. Indeed, as a result of  the arrival in Central European countries of  
more than two million people in 2015 alone, the controls at the EU’s internal 
borders in Germany, Denmark and Austria were reactivated (in accordance 
7 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council To-
wards a Reform of  the Common European Asylum System and Enhancing Legal Avenues to Europe, 
Com(2016) 197 final, 6 April 2016. See 
8 BillinG F., “The ECtHR on Disembarkation of  Rescued Refugees and Migrants at Greek 
Hotspots”, at EJILTALK.org, 25 Octiber 2019; European Council on Refugees and Exiles 
(ECRE), The Implementation of  the Hotspots in Italy and Greece – A Study, December 2016; PRI-
ETO, B. “Los hotspots, un eslabón débil en la gestión de la crisis de los refugiados”, Análisis 
del Real Instituto Elcano, ARI 25/2016, 4 March 2016.
9 These are the proposals FernánDez rojo makes in “Los hotspots: expansión de las tareas 
operativas y cooperación multilateral de las agencias europeas Frontex, Easo y Europol”, 61 
Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo,  nº 61, 2018, p. 1013.
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with the planned procedures). Thus, the survival of  one of  the pillars of  inte-
gration, namely, free movement in the Schengen Area, was threatened at peak 
moments of  the crisis.
Therein lies an unresolved substantive issue, namely, the legal status of  
displaced persons within the Schengen Area seeking international protection. 
In this crisis, displaced persons have overwhelmingly applied for refugee sta-
tus, in the hope of  obtaining humanitarian protection from the host state, or 
‘subsidiary protection’ status, one of  EU law’s contributions to international 
refugee law.
Additionally, as will be seen below, the dramatic crisis has shown that con-
trol of  the external Mediterranean Sea borders is an outstanding problem, as 
all the measures put into place by the states and coordinated by Frontex so 
far have been counterproductive or ineffective and have sparked major inter-
nal controversy, especially in states with external sea borders (Spain, Italy and 
Greece).
It is likewise worth noting that the crisis has highlighted the method of  
EU advancement, as, historically, it is the periodic crises that rock Europe 
that have ultimately led it to take small steps forwards in the integration of  
Europeans. In this regard, the transformation of  Frontex into the European 
Border and Coast Guard Agency10 with an increase in staff  and expanded 
mandate, including new powers to conduct search-and-rescue operations, may 
be illustrative.11
However, the migration crisis has opened deep cracks in the political te-
10 See Acosta sánchez M., “La nueva Guardia Europea de Fronteras y Costas, una necesaria 
evolución de FRONTEX”, Boletín IEEE, Nº 4, 2016, p. 466; De Bruycker, PH., “The Eu-
ropean border and coast guard: a new model built on an old logic”, European Papers, Vol. 1, 
Nº. 2, 2016, p. 559; santos Vara, J., “La transformación de Frontex en la Agencia Europea 
de la Guardia de Fronteras y Costas: ¿hacia una centralización en la gestión de las fronteras?” 
Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo,  Nº 59, 2018, p. 143.
11 See, for example, esteVe García, “The Search and Rescue Tasks Coordinated by the 
European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) Regarding the Surveillance of  
External Maritime Borders”, Paix et sécurité internationales, nº 5, 2017, p. 93, <https://
revistas.uca.es/index.php/paetsei/article/view/4654>. A revised Regulation was adopted 
by the Council the 8th November 2019,<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/
press-releases/2019/11/08/european-border-and-coast-guard-council-adopts-revised-
regulation/>, see FernánDez rojo, D. “The Umpteenth Reinforcement of  Frontex’s 
Operational Tasks: Third Time Lucky?”, EU Law Analysis, 04.06.2019.
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rrain and the legitimacy of  integration. There is evidence of  serious conse-
quences for the EU’s political integration, due to the direct economic and 
demographic impacts of  the massive influx of  people in search of  protection, 
which involve the presence (at least in the medium term) on European soil 
of  hundreds of  thousands of  people requiring aid and services from public 
authorities.
Unfortunately, some EU states have shown a rampant lack of  solidarity: 
following the 2015 decisions to take in 160,000 refugees, a referendum was 
called in Hungary to question the refugee redistribution decisions and some 
states have even rejected refugee quotas. This led to a severe internal crisis in 
the EU. However, in the author’s opinion, the repercussions of  these internal 
attitudes and policies for the essence, values and identity that the Union embo-
dies and protects are of  an even greater scale insofar as they call into question 
the legitimacy and narrative of  the European integration project itself.
The lack of  internal agreement and solidarity of  the Member States is 
largely what has overshadowed the adoption of  structural and temporary me-
asures by the EU, preventing an effective institutional, legal and political res-
ponse to the crisis. Of  course, the EU had not anticipated a critical migration 
situation such as the one it experienced, and its institutional and decision-ta-
king mechanisms are complicated and poorly suited to enable a rapid response 
equal to the task.
The 2016 deal with Turkey is perhaps a clear example of  this lack of  fore-
sight and poor coordination of  legal-institutional responses, notwithstanding 
some short-term successes in terms of  halting the massive arrival of  refugees 
and displaced persons mainly from Syria,12 the main burden for which conti-
12 The overall deal with Turkey, which played a key role in the 2015-2016 migration crisis, 
was reached in October 2015. It provides for both moving forwards on chapters of  the 
accession negotiations, opened in 2005, and a commitment by Turkey to visa liberalization 
and greater control of  border crossings from Turkish territory into Greece, with generous 
European aid to this end. The agreement (Statement) with Turkey on the readmission of  
refugees and relations with bordering countries was formally adopted on 18 March 2016 
(Agreement or Statement contained in Press Release 144/16 of  the Council, available at 
<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-state-
ment/>; lisa, P. ‘The EU-Turkey Agreement: a turning point in the EU’s policy approach 
to the refugee crisis but with the devil lurking in the detail’, Real Instituto Elcano Expert 
Comment 15/2016, 8 April 2016).
The nature of  the agreement was subject to considerable legal debate. See, for example, 
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nues to be assumed by Turkey.13
However, the Commission’s overall approach, via its European Agenda 
on Migration of  May 2015, has given rise to extremely important operational, 
legal and economic measures14 and has a very valuable strategic profile. In ad-
dition, other measures taken, such as the New Partnership Framework15 are quite 
far-reaching and can construct a foreign policy of  their own to address the 
major problems of  any kind caused by migratory pressure towards Europe.
santos Vara, J. “La declaración Unión Europea-Turquía de 18 de marzo de 2016: ¿un tra-
tado disfrazado?” in Retos para la acción exterior de la Unión Europea , 2017, p. 289; and uria 
GaVilan, “La declaración Unión Europea-Turquía: la externalización de la seguridad en 
detrimento de la protección de los derechos humanos”, in E. J. Martínez Pérez, c. Martí-
nez caPDeVila, M. aBaD castelos and R. casaDo raiGón (eds), Las amenazas a la seguridad 
internacional hoy, 2017, p. 89. This is because its legal status as a treaty or a simple political 
statement has significant consequences in terms of  monitoring its implementation and its 
enforcement by EU and state powers. In its decision on the case from February 2017, the 
European Court of  Justice indicated that it was not a treaty signed by any EU institution, 
but rather, where applicable, by the Member States (Orders of  the General Court of  28 
February 2017 in Cases T-192/16, T-193/16 and T-257/16 NF, NG and NM v European 
Council, in which the General Court of  the EU declares that it lacks jurisdiction to hear and 
determine the actions brought by three asylum seekers against the EU-Turkey statement 
which seeks to resolve the migration crisis, ECLI:EU:T:2017:128, 129 and 130).
13 For more information on the current situation and additional mobilization of  funds for, for 
example, schools and access to healthcare for Syrian child refugees, see the overview provided 
in the Communication EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey: the Commission proposes to mobilise 
additional funds for Syrian refugees, 14 March 2018, IP/18/1723, and the factsheet ‘EU-Turkey 
Statement – Two years on’, April 2018, available at <https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/
sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/20180314_eu-
turkey-two-years-on_en.pdf>. 
14 The European Agenda on Migration, in COM(2015) 240 final, 13 May 2015. For information on 
progress on the Agenda’s implementation, see the Communications of  the Commission of  
10 February 2016, available at <https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-271_en.htm>, 
and of  28 September 2016, available at <https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-
3183_en.htm>. More recently, Progress report on the Implementation of  the European 
Agenda on Migration, COM(2019) 126 final,  6.3.2019 <https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/
sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/20190306_com-
2019-126-report_en.pdf>; and the Progress report on the Implementation of  the European Agenda on 
Migration of  16.10.2019, COM(2019)481 final.
15 COM(2016) 385 final 07.06.2016, Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the European Council, the Council and the European Investment Bank on 
establishing a new Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration.
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Overall, the EU’s actions to address and regulate migration, refugee and 
asylum issues have been impressive in recent years.16 However, the set of  me-
asures and policies is strongly hindered by a Euro-centric vision based on 
security issues and the formula of  development cooperation in exchange for 
control of  borders and migration flows in the states of  origin and transit. This 
vision does not place African, Middle Eastern and Central Asian countries’ in-
terests and approaches on an equal footing with Europe’s medium- and long-
term interests in these complex migration issues.
In this context, the European Agenda on Migration continues to be imple-
mented.17 The Commission believes that the situation is still fragile18 and aims 
to strengthen the EU’s Asylum Agency19 by shifting the emphasis to the regu-
lations for the return of  migrants20 and to strengthening the European Bor-
der and Coast Guard Agency.21 However, possible avenues of  legal access to 
Member States, such as access to international protection through the Euro-
pean Humanitarian Visa, have not yet been clearly defined.22 The formulas 
proposed to date (new Blue Card, new resettlement scheme, strengthening of  
cooperation with third states with pilot projects)23 ostensibly seem insufficient 
as a strategic response.
3. THE GATES OF EUROPE: TURKEY, MOROCCO AND LIBYA
There is already a certain well-established perspective regarding the rou-
tes of  entry into Europe. Although the European federal area of  free move-
16 For an overview, see EU Asylum, Borders and External Cooperation on Migration – Recent devel-
opments, European Parliament PE621.878, EPRS May 2018.
17 See the Commission Communication ‘European Agenda on Migration: Continuous efforts needed 
to sustain progress’, 14 March 2018, IP/18/1763, setting out the next steps and objectives to be 
pursued in the framework of  the Agenda.
18 Communication ‘European Agenda on Migration: Still fragile situation gives no cause for complacency’, 
16 May 2018 IP/18/3743.
19 MEMO/18/5714 of  12 September 2018.
20 MEMO/18/5713 of  12 September 2018.
21 MEMO/18/5715 of  12 September 2018.
22 See sánchez leGiDo, A. “El arriesgado acceso a la protección internacional en la Europa 
fortaleza: la batalla por el Visado Humanitario europeo”, Revista de Derecho Comunitario Euro-
peo ,nº 57, 2017, p. 433.
23 IP/18/5712 of  12 September 2018.
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ment was effectively created in spring 1995, it was not until the creation of  
the Frontex Agency, in 2004, that there began to be a global EU approach, 
with data and verification of  the points of  entry, external border crossings 
and migration trends.
It was thus verified that the main routes of  entry for irregular immigra-
tion are not, as was once feared, via the external borders of  Eastern Europe, 
but rather the external Mediterranean borders of  the southern European 
countries. Specifically, most of  the arrivals take place in Italy, Greece and 
Spain, although these countries are not usually the final destinations of  the 
people who irregularly or illegally cross their external borders.
Various aspects of  this finding should be highlighted: 
— There is an obvious physical proximity factor, determined by geogra-
phy, that facilitates irregular access. In the case of  Spain, access occurs in two 
areas: the area of  the Strait of  Gibraltar and the cities of  Ceuta and Melilla, 
and the Canary Islands area. In the case of  Italy, it occurs through the Italian 
islands off  the Tunisian coast, such as Lampedusa. In the case of  Greece, it 
occurs through both the European land border with Turkey delimited by the 
River Evros (or Maritsa) and through the Aegean Sea route, to the islands 
under Greek sovereignty closest to the Turkish coast.
— All three European countries are accessed from neighbouring states 
in the southern Mediterranean that are countries of  transit or origin of  mi-
gration: from Morocco to Spain, from Tunisia and Libya to Italy, and from 
Turkey to Greece.
— These areas of  transit are home to territorial claims or disputes be-
tween countries on the northern and southern shore of  the Mediterranean: 
between Spain and Morocco over the Spanish cities, islands and rocks on the 
African coast24; and between Turkey and Greece over the Aegean Islands 
under Greek sovereignty.
— These neighbouring and bordering states, in turn, are located in or 
border with regions, continents and countries that produce, and will continue 
24 The link between migrations and territorial claims in Gonzalez Garcia, I., “Rechazo 
en las fronteras exteriores europeas con Marruecos: inmigración y derechos humanos en 
las vallas de Ceuta y Melilla, 2005-2017”, Revista General de Derecho Europeo, Nº. 43, 2017; 
“The Spanish-Moroccan Cooperation on Immigration: The Summary Returns Cases of  Isla 
de Tierra-Alhucemas (2012) and Ceuta and Melilla (2014)”, Spanish yearbook of  international 
law, Nº 19, 2015,  349.
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to give rise to, migration flows from North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, the 
Middle East, West Asia and Central Asia.
— In all cases, the migration takes place across sea borders, although in 
the cases of  Greece and Spain, it also takes place across external land borders. 
Nevertheless, since 2005, the largest number of  migrants to reach or attempt 
to reach Europe has come by sea.
— There are EU agreements with these southern Mediterranean coun-
tries, and even bilateral agreements (Spain-Morocco, Italy-Libya), that have 
restricted access by means of  short-term solutions that fail to address the 
structural issues underlying irregular migration to Europe. It is worth noting 
in this regard that the approach pursued to date has not been the formal one 
consisting of  the conclusion of  mixed Treaties, Agreements by the EU or 
bilateral Agreements by its Member States. For instance, it is argued that the 
EU-Turkey deal of  2016 should not be maintained as such, due to its signi-
ficant shortcomings, including its very nature as a dubiously legal instrument 
questionably regulated by Public International Law.25
Additionally, bilateral agreements between EU states and third states have 
become a necessary complementary instrument for issues of  migration flows 
to the EU. Particular attention should be called to the ‘agreement’ between 
Italy and Libya,26 also criticized for the legal format used, i.e., a Memorandum 
of  Understanding (MOU), and the direct and indirect negative consequences 
it has had regarding respect for the basic fundamental rights of  migrants in 
Libyan territory27.
— The EU considers the Eastern, Central and Western Mediterranean to 
be routes or gates of  access. Frontex data show that the closure of  or increa-
25 For the agreement with Turkey, see Peers, S. ‘The final EU/Turkey refugee deal: a legal 
assessment’, EU Law Analysis 18 March 2016; Den heijer and sPijkerBoer, ‘Is the EU-Tur-
key refugee and migration deal a treaty?’, EU Law Analysis, 7 April 2016; and toyGür and 
BenVenuti, ‘One year on: an assessment of  the EU-Turkey statement on refugees’, Análisis 
del Real Instituto Elcano, ARI 21/2017, 21 March 2017.
26 PalM, “The Italy-Libya Memorandum of  Understanding: The baseline of  a policy approach 
aimed at closing all doors to Europe?”, EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy, <https://
eumigrationlawblog.eu/the-italy-libya-memorandum-of-understanding-the-baseline-of-a-
policy-approach-aimed-at-closing-all-doors-to-europe/>, 2 October 2017. The Italy-Libya 
MOU is available at <http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/
MEMORANDUM_translation_finalversion.doc.pdf>.
27 “Italy to renew anti-migration deal with Libya”. The Guardian 31.10.2019.
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sed border control along one route leads to the reactivation of  one of  the 
other two, such that the routes alternate across different periods, due to crises 
or diversions of  the access routes to Mediterranean Europe.
All these considerations suggest that these arrival routes through what is 
graphically referred to as the Gates of  Europe are quite likely to be permanent 
in the near to medium- and long-term future.
III. VULNERABILITY OF EUROPE’S EXTERNAL BORDERS?
External border control in the EU dates back more than 24 years, and 
identified problems, such as external airport borders, which no longer pose a 
structural problem, or land borders, have been addressed. Important measu-
res have been taken, such as the introduction of  biometric identifiers on vi-
sas.28 The trend of  strengthening access control at external borders has been 
confirmed in the wake of  jihadist terrorism attacks. For instance, measures 
have been taken to reinforce checks at the borders of  the Schengen Area, 
expanding them to include EU citizens in general29 through the amendment 
of  the Schengen Borders Code.30
However, the inbound migration of  recent years has posed a serious pro-
blem of  vulnerability of  the EU’s external borders 31, both on land and at 
airports.
28 See, for example, Art. 13 of  Regulation (EC) No. 810/2009 of  the European Parliament 
and of  the Council of  13 July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code), OJ 
L 243, 15 September 2009, p. 1-58. 
29 Proposal for a Regulation of  the European Parliament and of  the Council amending Reg-
ulation No 562/2006 (EC) as regards the reinforcement of  checks against relevant databases 
at external borders, COM(2015) 670 final, 15 December 2015. 
30 Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  15 
March 2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of  per-
sons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), OJ L 105, 13 April 2006, p. 1.
31 See the Conclusions of  the European Council of  20.06.2019, and the New Strategic Agenda 
2019-2024: “We must ensure the integrity of  our territory”. The migration policy issues of  
this Strategic Agenda are referred in the chapter “Protecting citizens and freedoms”, cfr. 
<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/39922/20-21-euco-final-conclusions-en.pdf>.
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1. INTERNAL BORDERS AND RESILIENCE OF THE SCHENGEN AREA
The logic of  the Schengen common area of  free movement entails esta-
blishing common external border control so as to enable the free movement 
of  any person of  any nationality within the area referred to here as ‘federal’ 
for the purposes of  free movement. This has an important consequence, 
namely, it makes it possible to determine which people are entering or leaving 
through the common external border; in contrast, once they have entered the 
federal common area, they cannot be tracked, as there are no mechanisms for 
doing so. As the Frontex Agency itself  has noted, “There is no EU system 
capable of  tracing people’s movements within the EU following illegal bor-
der-crossing”.32
The fact is that the massive inflows to Greece, mainly with a view to 
reaching Germany and Sweden, led to overflowing movements known as 
‘secondary displacements’. These people were forced by geography to fo-
llow land routes mostly through the Balkans to reach the Schengen territory 
via Slovenia or Austria. These sudden arrivals of  hundreds of  thousands of  
people led to the establishment along internal borders of  fences, barriers 
and strong access control against the backdrop of  an initially receptive Ger-
many. This, in turn, led some countries to reintroduce certain intra-European 
controls. Additionally, the brutal jihadist terrorist attacks in Paris (November 
2015) and Nice (July 2016) prompted France to declare a state of  emergency 
and to re-establish systematic control at its borders.
The problem with the reintroduction of  internal border controls is that 
they could potentially become permanent and that these types of  events 
could be prolonged, making them the norm, rather than the exception, as 
provided for by law. Additionally, Member State notifications of  the tempo-
rary reintroduction of  control in accordance with Article 25 of  the Schengen 
Borders Code have increased sharply since 2015, with references in recent 
years to threats due to the existence of  ‘significant secondary movements’.33
In the author’s view, this very appreciable impact on the Schengen system 
of  free movement has caused serious, albeit reparable, damage. Indeed, as 
32 Frontex, General Report 2015, at 2.1, p. 10. Frontex - Risk Analysis for 2016, p. 6
33 See the list of  Notifications 2006-2018 at <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-
we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen/reintroduction-border-control/docs/ms_
notifications_-_reintroduction_of_border_control_en.pdf>.
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argued elsewhere,34 several powerful legal and practical arguments confirm 
the reversibility of  the measures taken by the Member States at some of  their 
internal borders:
• Primary law: As seen above, Article 77(1)(a) TFEU has a legal force 
that leaves no room for doubt regarding the agreed attribution of  
powers and the practical objective to be achieved, i.e. non-control of  
any internal land, sea or airport border between Schengen Area states. 
• The short-term nature of  the internal controls in the ‘federal’ Schen-
gen Area implemented as a result of  the refugee crisis. Control is 
restored in accordance with pre-established procedures, namely, no-
tification of  the temporary reintroduction of  border control, in ac-
cordance with a specific regulation, Regulation 1053/2013, which is 
being applied.35 This regulation provides for regular situation reviews 
and Council authorizations to prolong control at certain points or 
sectors due to the existence of  a threat to the overall functioning of  
the Schengen Area.36
• The highly partial geographical nature of  the temporary reintroduc-
tion of  control, which is not carried out along the entire land, air or 
port border of  some states, but solely at certain border crossings on 
sections determined in advance to be problematic. Only in the case of  
France was notification given of  the reintroduction of  control on all 
borders, due to the state of  emergency declared following the attacks 
in Paris and Nice, as well as for events such as the Tour de France.
These reasons are complemented with planning, from the start, by the 
Commission for the gradual reinstatement of  complete freedom of  move-
34 Del Valle GalVez, ‘Los refugiados, las fronteras exteriores…’, supra note 2, at 762-765.
35 Council Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013 of  7 October 2013 establishing an evaluation and 
monitoring mechanism to verify the application of  the Schengen acquis and repealing the 
Decision of  the Executive Committee of  16 September 1998 setting up a Standing Com-
mittee on the evaluation and implementation of  Schengen, OJ L 295 of  6 November 2013, 
p. 27 et seq.
36 Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/894 of  12 May 2016 setting out a recommen-
dation for temporary internal border control in exceptional circumstances putting the overall 
functioning of  the Schengen area at risk, OJ L 15 of  18 June 2016, at 8 et seq.
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ment.37 Overall, whilst in the early years the refugee crisis did lead to a visible 
repeal of  the non-control of  persons at certain internal border points in the 
Schengen Area, the general system of  free movement of  persons tends to be 
progressively restored, although not with the speed initially envisaged for the 
return to normal movement without control in the Schengen Area.
In fact, a proposal for a Regulation amending the framework for the tem-
porary reintroduction of  border control at internal borders is currently ma-
king its way through the legislative process.38 The Commission intends to 
allow an increase in the time limit for this type of  control, although with grea-
ter safeguards and procedural and evaluation requirements, in accordance 
with its conviction that it must always be approached as an exceptional mea-
sure of  last resort.39 As noted, it is ultimately a question of  imposing order on 
these state initiatives that could involve an attempt to renationalize responses 
to threats to the public order and internal security, placing special emphasis 
on the exceptional nature of  any limitation that may arise in relation to the 
free movement of  persons.40
A separate question is the related issue, not adequately addressed by the 
EU or its Member States, of  displaced persons seeking refuge and moving 
within the EU until they reach their destination, without identification and in 
37 Back to Schengen - A Roadmap, Communication of  4 March 2016, COM(2016) 120 final, 
since the Commission adopted a plan to return to a situation of  normality in March 2016.
38 Proposal for a Regulation of  the European Parliament and of  the Council amending Reg-
ulation (EU) 2016/399 as regards the rules applicable to the temporary reintroduction of  
border control at internal borders, COM(2017) 571 final - 2017/0245 (COD), 27 September 
2017. See European Parliament legislative resolution of  4 April 2019 on the proposal for 
a regulation of  the European Parliament and of  the Council amending Regulation (EU) 
2016/399 as regards the rules applicable to the temporary reintroduction of  border control 
at internal borders (COM(2017)0571 – C8-0326/2017 – 2017/0245(COD)).
39 Communication on preserving and strengthening Schengen, COM(2017) 570 final, 27 
September 2017; State of  the Union 2017 - Preserving and strengthening Schengen to im-
prove security and safeguard Europe’s freedoms, 27 September 2017, IP/17/3407, <http://
europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-3407_en.htm>.
40 janer torrens, “El restablecimiento temporal de controles en las fronteras interiores de 
la Unión Europea como respuesta a las amenazas al orden público y a la seguridad interior: 
entre la excepcionalidad y la normalidad”, Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo, Nº 61, 2018, 
p. 899, at 931.
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a situation of  clear vulnerability.41 This is also a consequence of  the Member 
States’ option of  not creating macro-camps in EU territory for the recep-
tion, registration, identification and processing of  refugees’ asylum claims, as 
Frontex once proposed.
In any case, whilst the common European response to the migration cha-
llenge may have fallen short of  a ‘collective epic’,42 the case of  the refugee 
crisis has shown that the Schengen Area is reasonably robust and resilient in 
unexpected serious situations. In the 24 years since it came into force in 1995, 
this historical experience has followed a course that has evidenced fragility, 
but also, at essence, a great capacity to withstand and overcome challenges 
in tricky or delicate situations. In the author’s view, this has to do with many 
factors, the very strong soundness of  the unified economic area being one of  
the most important.
Since the agreement between the EU states and Turkey of  March 2016 
stopped the inflow of  refugees, the asylum claims of  the millions of  people 
who arrived in 2015-2016 have begun to be studied or they have been placed 
under the protection of  the different states. Therefore, the problem today 
is not one of  internal borders and the guarantee of  free movement, but of  
massive access to and reception at the EU’s external borders, where contro-
lled management of  the crossings and registration and hosting of  this huge 
influx of  arrivals proved impossible, a situation that could happen again in 
the short, medium or long term.
2. EXTERNAL BORDERS AND THE NON-VIABILITY OF SEA BORDER CONTROL
The Union’s external borders have very special characteristics, as they 
were created by the Schengen Agreements according to a model that was 
later inherited and assumed by the EU from 1997 onwards. Sharing the same 
control systems for entry into and exit from the ‘federal’ internal territory 
of  free movement is, as noted, an historical experience and evolution of  the 
41 naïr proposes the massive concession of  ID cards entitling the bearer to travel freely, a 
transit passport based on the ‘Nansen passport’ model (Refugiados, Barcelona, 2016, Chapter 
13). 
42 The term ‘collective epic’ (épica colectiva) was coined by janer torrens (‘El restablecimiento 
temporal…’, supra note 40, at 930) in his overview of  the reintroduction of  internal border 
control following the refugee crisis. 
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European states’ borders.43 Additionally, as a political entity in statu nascendi, 
the Union needs to maintain a well-defined territory in which entry and exit 
across external borders is well controlled. The cumulative experience since 
1995 — including under the international-law Schengen system prior to its 
absorption into EU law — means that the EU already has more than 20 
years of  experience with external border control.44 The model’s evolution 
has allowed it to reasonably assume control at land, airport and even seaport 
borders.
However, there are significant obstacles to carrying out border control at 
the external sea borders. By their very nature, these borders are very difficult 
to manage, especially given the continuous mass arrivals of  migrants over the 
years via the Mediterranean. No single state, nor even the EU without the 
co-involvement of  its Member States, can tackle these problems of  emigra-
tion in the Mediterranean Sea and of  the sudden mass arrivals or avalanches 
of  dozens or hundreds of  thousands of  people alone.
In fact, the system has not proven to work well when the control tasks 
are carried out in marine areas beyond state jurisdiction, i.e. beyond the 12 
miles of  territorial sea. Indeed, the definition of  external border has gradually 
been adapted to the need to push some border control functions beyond the 
port, into the high seas or even the marine areas of  third states from which 
immigrants depart, as in the case of  Senegal and the cayuco boat crisis of  2006 
in the Canary Islands (Frontex Joint Operation Hera).
Hence, the seemingly unsolvable issue of  the Mediterranean Sea borders, 
as the control of  external borders originally designed for the Schengen Area 
is poorly suited to this environment. Therefore, the European marine areas 
and borders pose certain specific challenges that make ensuring effective sur-
veillance quite difficult: the marine environment itself, the existence of  large 
areas of  the high seas, and the existence of  differentiated SAR rescue areas, 
all in a conflict-ridden context of  third states from the southern coast of  the 
Mediterranean with diverse but highly complex problems. Furthermore, with 
regard to the rescue of  immigrants on the high seas, wide-open questions 
continue to surround the SAR regions in the Mediterranean and states’ obli-
43 See, ‘Las fronteras de la Unión…’, supra note 3. 
44 Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  15 
March 2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of  per-
sons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), OJ L 105, 13 April 2006, p. 1.
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gations in these regions, especially concerning the disembarkation of  rescued 
persons.45
Nothing tried to date to halt or prevent sea immigration has offered good 
prospects of  becoming a sustainable, reasonable and permanent solution to 
the problems, which include the fight against human trafficking. An original 
body of  law has been adopted to address issues affected by gaps in interna-
tional law, ranging from the regulation creating Frontex to that creating the 
Border and Coast Guard Agency, by way of  the rapid border intervention 
teams (RABITs) regulation46 or the regulation establishing rules for the sur-
veillance of  external sea borders in the context of  joint operations. There 
have even been moments of  flirtation with the idea of  a military response, 
in some cases fortunately averted by the UN itself  and, in others, undertaken 
within the context of  NATO or EUNAVFOR MED/Operation Sophia.47
The extraordinary fragility and insecurity of  Europe’s Mediterranean bor-
ders make maritime surveillance insufficient and give rise to myriad new pro-
blems. These problems include issues such as the extraterritorial processing 
of  asylum claims, the human rights of  migrants in different marine areas, or 
the disembarkation of  migrants in third states.48 The most widely reported 
45 Another sensitive issue is the applicable regulation and obligation for merchant boats to 
proceed to the rescue and disembarkation of  immigrants. See sMith, “Uncertainty, Alert and 
Distress: The Precarious Position of  NGO Search and Rescue Operations in the Central 
Mediterranean”, Paix et sécurité internationales nº 5, 2017, 29, <https://revistas.uca.es/index.
php/paetsei/article/view/4652>.
46 Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  11 July 
2007 establishing a mechanism for the creation of  Rapid Border Intervention Teams and 
amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 as regards that mechanism and regulating 
the tasks and powers of  guest officers, OJ L 199 of  31 July 2007, p. 30-39.
47 See carli, E., “Operation eunavfor med sophia in the framework of  the european agenda 
on migration: Practical aspects and questions of  international law”, Freedom, Security & Justice: 
European Legal Studies,  Nº. 2, 2018, p. 135; acosta sánchez, M. “Sobre el ámbito competen-
cial de las operaciones de paz: El enfoque integral de la operación militar Sophia de la UE 
ante la crisis migratoria”, Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, nº 12, 2019, p. 15.
48 See Marinai, S. “The interception and rescue at sea of  asylum seekers in the light of  the 
new EU legal framework”. Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo, 55, 2016, at 901. In 2015, 
no actions were taken to disembark migrants rescued in the Mediterranean by joint opera-
tions in third countries, cfr.  Frontex’ Annual Report on the implementation on the EU Regulation 
656/2014 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  15 May 2014 establishing rules for the 
surveillance of  the external sea borders, 2016. 
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cases of  NGO or merchant vessels carrying migrants rescued in the territo-
rial waters of  Libya or on the high seas being denied access to port (as in the 
case of  the Aquarius, in 2018, or the Open Arms case in 2019)49 fall into this 
category.
In fact, the barrage of  legal problems posed to international and Euro-
pean law by irregular migration and migration in the Mediterranean in terms 
of  the different practical control and rescue actions carried out by states and 
the EU is simply overwhelming.50 This is especially true with regard to issues 
of  respect and protection of  the human rights of  migrants51 found at sea 
with the intention of  reaching Europe. In this context one finds the morally 
devastating fact that the maritime migration routes account for the brunt of  
the horrifying objective data on massive daily deaths of  migrants trying to 
reach Europe by sea, migrants pushed mainly by human trafficking rings into 
terrifying situations of  danger and death at sea.52
49 In this regard, see the lucid analysis by PaPastaVriDis, ‘The Aquarius Incident and the Law 
of  the Sea: Is Italy in Violation of  the Relevant Rules?’, at EJILTALK.org, 27 June 2018. 
50 Amongst others, see: Di FiliPPo, M., “Irregular Migration Across the Mediterranean Sea: 
Problematic Issues Concerning the International Rules on Safeguard of  Life at Sea”, Paix et 
Sécurité Internationales (2013), nº 1, 53; FRA-European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 
Fundamental Rights at Europe’s southern sea borders, Luxembourg, 2013; Marinai, S., “The Action 
of  Greece and Spain against Irregular Migration by Sea”, in A. Del Vecchio (ed.), Internation-
al Law of  the Sea – Current Trends and Controversial Issues (The Hague, 2014) 29; Moreno-lax 
V. – PaPastaVriDis, E. ‘Boat Refugees’ and Migrants at Sea: A Comprehensive Approach- Integrating 
Maritime Security with Human Rights, Brill, 2016;  rijPMa, J., “The Patrolling of  the European 
Union’s External Maritime Border: Preventing the Rule of  Law from Getting Lost at Sea”, 
in International Law of  the Sea – Current Trends…, cit., at 77; and soBrino J. M.  and oanta, G., 
“Control y vigilancia de las fronteras en los diferentes espacios maritimos”, 14 Anuario de la 
Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad de La Coruña, nº 14, 2010, p. 759. The Commission Staff  
Working Document Study on the international law instruments in relation to illegal immigration by sea, 
SEC(2007)691, 15 May 2007, likewise remains of  interest. 
51 See the author’s examination of  external border issues from a human rights perspective in 
Del Valle GálVez, ‘La fragilidad de los derechos humanos en las fronteras exteriores euro-
peas, y la externalización/extraterritorialidad de los controles migratorios’, in J. soroeta li-
ceras and N. alonso MoreDa (eds), Anuario de los Cursos de Derechos Humanos de Donostia-San 
Sebastián, Volume XVIII-2018, Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia 2019, p. 25. See sanchez leGiDo, 
A. “Externalización de controles migratorios versus Derechos Humanos” REEI, 37, 2019.
52 See, for example, aMnesty international, Lives Adrift: Refugees and Migrants in Peril in the 
Central Mediterranean, 2014.
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In this context, the EU’s aim of  coordinating its sea border control in 
the Mediterranean and on the southern external sea borders is not viable. 
Migratory pressure will continue in the short, medium and long term along 
the channels of  arrival by sea to Europe (Eastern, Central and Western Medi-
terranean) and may even be occasionally accentuated in critical periods due to 
the changing and unstable situation of  the African and Middle Eastern neigh-
bourhood. Experience shows that the EU has, in the past, been overwhelmed 
and thrown into crisis by the sudden arrival by sea of  a few thousands of  
people (as in the case of  the cayuco boats in the Canary Islands in 200653 or 
the frequent arrivals to the Italian islands off  the coast of  Tunisia in the Cen-
tral Mediterranean). Consequently, the internal conflicts of  third states could 
relatively easily call the EU’s entire system of  reception and free movement 
within its internal territory into question once again.
In the author’s opinion, it is thus the EU’s sea borders that will require it 
to undertake a new border policy. Indeed, the circumstances and problems 
discussed here confirm that new approaches to migration flows and external 
border control must be organized, subject to a more integrated management. 
3. ACTIVATING THE INTEGRATED EXTERNAL BORDER MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
The refugee crisis in Europe in recent years also seems to have led to the 
consolidation of  the aspect of  the border control policy known as the inte-
grated border management system.
What the TFEU calls the ‘integrated management system for external 
borders’ (currently referred to as European Integrated Border Management) is pro-
vided for under the decisive Article 77 TFEU: 
‘1. The Union shall develop a policy with a view to:
(c) the gradual introduction of  an integrated management system for external bor-
ders.’
The title of  the relevant chapter of  the TFEU (Policies on Border Chec-
ks, Asylum and Immigration) points to three main areas, but the subsequent 
provisions seem to describe a gradually descending level of  EU border acti-
vity: very powerful with regard to internal borders, likewise significant with 
regard to external control, but less farsighted with regard to the regulation of  
53 See acosta sánchez and Del Valle GálVez, “La crisis de los cayucos. La Agencia Euro-
pea de Fronteras – FRONTEX y el control marítimo de la inmigración clandestina”, Tiempo 
de Paz, nº 83, 2006, p. 19.
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the external border management system.
In fact, no specific article is devoted to the integrated border management 
system, unlike asylum (Article 78) and immigration (Article 79), suggesting a 
lower level of  intensity in terms of  EU regulation and powers. Indeed, inso-
far as it is an objective of  the common policy (Article 77(1)), the treaty only 
provides for the subsequent adoption of  legal acts. Specifically, Article 77(2)
(d) provides:
2. For the purposes of  paragraph 1, the European Parliament and the Council, 
acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt measures 
concerning:
(d) any measure necessary for the gradual establishment of  an integrated manage-
ment system for external borders;
Following the migration crisis, however, the time for its activation seems 
to have come. In this regard, attention should be called to the Plan to develop 
an Integrated External Border Management Strategy, adopted on March 2018, who-
se main elements are: greater cooperation and shared information, with the 
Border and Coast Guard playing a key role; enhanced harmonization of  the 
common rules and standards applied under the Schengen Borders Code; and 
risk analysis, providing for contingency plans and rapid response capabilities. 
The stated need to integrate other policies, such as the Security Policy and the 
fight against cross-border crime, and to cooperate with third states, especially 
on returns, should likewise be highlighted. Finally, the need to improve the 
funding and technical and human resources of  the Integrated Border Mana-
gement System is also underscored.54
The main element of  this integrated management strategy is undoubtedly 
the Border and Coast Guard. To this end, in September 2018, the Commis-
sion approved the proposal for a new Regulation of  the European Border 
and Coast Guard, which includes EUROSUR; this Regulation was finally 
adopted in November 2019.55
54 The main elements for developing the European Integrated Border Management Strategy - Annex 6 of  
the Communication ‘Progress report on the Implementation of  the European Agenda on 
Migration’ COM(2018) 250 final of  14 March 2018.
55 See supra note 11, and the 23.10.2019 last Proposal at <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/
doc/document/PE-33-2019-INIT/en/pdf>. Other documents: Proposal for a Regulation 
of  the European Parliament and of  the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard 
and repealing Council Joint Action n°98/700/JHA, Regulation (EU) n° 1052/2013 of  the 
European Parliament and of  the Council and Regulation (EU) n° 2016/1624 of  the Euro-
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IV. ‘EXTERNALIZATION’, ‘EXTRATERRITORIALITY’ AND ‘DETERRITORIALITY’ OF 
MIGRATION CONTROL
In a context of  widespread perception, in public opinion and amongst Eu-
ropean governments, of  vulnerability of  the southern external border, re-
ferences to the so-called ‘externalization’ of  border control are increasingly 
common.56
Border action by EU Member States outside of  European territory seems 
to be an inevitable trend in Europe, with various manifestations of  new and 
complex border control functions that are problematic in several ways, with 
control instruments extending not only beyond borderlines, but into various 
places and areas of  Europe’s bordering territories and those of  other neigh-
bouring states. Several manifestations of  this trend can be found, all referring 
to extraterritorial problems related to the performance of  border functions, 
in the margins of  or outside EU territory, with European pre-border control 
instruments.57
The following sections will look at various aspects of  this recent external 
border dimension.
1. THE DETERRITORIALIZATION OF MIGRATION CONTROL AND BORDER 
FUNCTIONS
An initial issue has to do with the concepts and terms used to refer to 
these topics. In the author’s view, there are shortcomings in how they are used 
both in the literature and in the media in reference to migration realities.
The terms are quite varied, since the practices have been given different 
names. Nagore Casas and Abrisketa Uriarte refer, for example, to an extensi-
pean Parliament and of  the Council;  European Parliament legislative resolution of  17 April 
2019 (COM(2018)0631 – C8-0406/2018 – 2018/0330A(COD)) TA/2019/0415. See also 
Report from the Commission to the European parliament and the council on the evaluation of  the European 
Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) A contribution from the European Commission to 
the Leaders’ meeting in Salzburg on 19-20 September 2018, COM (2018/632), 12.09.2018. 
56 See rijPMa J. and creMona, M. “The Extra-Territorialisation of  EU Migration Policies and 
the Rule of  Law”, EUI Working Papers - Law 2007/1; Del Valle GálVez, A., “Refugiados y 
crisis migratorias: fronteras y desterritorialidad en las puertas de Europa”, Chapter in riPol 
carulla S., Derecho, Inmigración y Empresa, Barcelona, 2019, p. 89.
57 casas, N., “The instruments of  pre-border control in the EU: A new source of  vulnerabil-
ity for asylum-seekers?”, in European Commission – FRAME, 31 May 2016, 30.
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ve catalogue of  academic terms used to refer to this reality.58 Of  course, one 
can also find terms such as ‘border displacement’, the ‘delegation’ or ‘remote 
control’ of  migration, ‘off-shore asylum’, and ‘policing at a distance’,59 as well 
as those that can be summed up in the term policies of  non-entrée.60
Most of  these terms seek to reflect border realities that, whilst different 
or novel, nevertheless affect the will of  the EU and the Member States to 
distance or prevent the arrival of  migrants at their external borders through 
a twofold series of  measures leading to the apparent displacement or sharing 
of  border control functions with third states:
– First, with measures such as programmes, action plans or international 
agreements to encourage third states (of  origin or transit) to monitor their 
borders and migration flows in order to prevent them from physically acces-
sing EU Member State territory, accepting the positioning in their territory, 
or the rejection, of  refugees and migrants in general who come from other 
states but aim to reach European states as their final destination. 
– Second, through the carrying out of  border control functions by the 
Member States themselves outside their sovereignty and/or territorial juris-
diction (land and sea). 
In general, the terms externalization or extraterritorialization of  borders and 
their control are frequently used, often as synonyms.61 
58 ‘In addition to “politics of  non-entrée”, several terms have been used by scholars to re-
fer to this phenomenon, which is subject to increasing attention by literature and media: 
“outsourcing, externalisation, offshoring or extraterritorialisation of  migration management; 
external migration governance; remote migration policing”; “de-territorialisation of  border 
control”; “politics of  extraterritorial processing”; “neo-refoulement”; or “limes imperii”. All 
of  these terms refer to the various types of  interception measures used by states against 
asylum-seekers and refugees, measures which are usually developed by the wealthiest states, 
notably the United States, Australia, Canada and EU Member States’, casas, N. writes (Ibid., 
at 31-32). See also the terms cited in aBrisketa uriarte, “La dimensión externa del derecho 
de la Unión Europea en materia de refugio y asilo: un examen desde la perspectiva del non-re-
foulement”, Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo , nº 56, 2017, p. 119, at 125-126.
59 See, for example, GuilD E. and BiGo, D., “Policing at a distance: Schengen Visa policies” 
in Controlling Frontiers - Free Movement Into and Within Europe, London, 2005, p. 203.
60 See sánchez leGiDo, A., ‘El arriesgado acceso…’, supra note 22, at 439 et seq.
61 See, for example, Moreno-lax, V. and leMBerG-PeDersen, M. “Border induced displace-
ment: The ethical and legal implications of  distance-creation through externalization”, QIL,. 
Zoom-in, 56, 2019, at 5; GaBrielli, L. ‘La externalización europea del control migratorio. ¿La 
acción española como modelo?’, Anuario CIDOB de la inmigración (2017) 127; and ZaPata 
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However, these concepts should be used with greater accuracy, in order 
to determine the consequences and legal scope of  the related terms. These 
terms are sometimes figurative (e.g. to create a ‘buffer zone’ or ‘buffer states’ 
around Europe) and are intended to reflect the reality of  the systematic out-
sourcing of  certain border and migration control functions beyond the bor-
derline and the land, seaport and airport checkpoints and border crossings. 
The terms or definitions used by authors are sometimes stark.62 However, 
there is some awareness of  encompassing a variety of  situations that should 
be differentiated.63
In short, these are situations that place certain functions that states have 
traditionally performed at the border or at checkpoints, as well as certain 
measures and actions related to immigration and migration flows, outside 
their land, air and sea territory. Accordingly, for the purposes of  the present 
article, this set of  situations will be referred to as the deterritorialization of  
migration control, as the various scenarios and realities all take place outside 
EU territory.
Therefore, in keeping with this effort to achieve greater conceptual accu-
racy, a more useful term might be deterritoriality, which is more neutral than 
Barrero R. and zaraGoza cristiani, ‘Externalización de las políticas de inmigración en Es-
paña ¿giro de orientación política en la gestión de fronteras y flujos migratorios?’, 8 Panorama 
social, nº 8, 2008.
62 For example, Fanjul points to ‘la lógica de “externalizacion” que ha seguido la política 
migratoria europea desde la crisis de los cayucos de 2005-2006: comprar o forzar la colabo-
ración de semidemocracias en el trabajo sucio’ [the logic of  “externalization” that European 
migration policy has followed since the cayuco boat crisis of  2005-2006: paying or forcing 
semi-democracies to cooperate on the dirty work] [translated from the Spanish];  whilst 
Pinyol writes of  ‘colaborar con países vecinos para delegarles el control de sus fronteras, en 
un intento de reducir la presión migratoria (habitualmente sobreestimada) y no responsabi-
lizarse de la protección de derechos de las personas migrantes’ [cooperating with neighbour-
ing countries to delegate control of  their borders to them, in an attempt to reduce (routinely 
overestimated) migratory pressure and avoid the responsibility for protecting the rights of  
migrants], [translated from the Spanish], in Agenda Exterior sobre Inmigración y Refugio, 28 
June 2018.
63 See ABrisketa uriarte, ‘La dimensión externa…’, supra note 58, at 157. In ‘Member State 
Responsibility for Migration Control within Third States: Externalisation Revisited”, Europe-
an Journal of  Migration and Law,  2013, p. 319, McnaMara differentiates between ‘externalisa-
tion’ and ‘external dimension’, using the latter in situations in which state control is weaker 
and indirect. 
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those mentioned above, as it evokes the positioning of  certain border control 
and migration policy functions outside the territory, to be carried out by third 
states or by the state itself. The Dictionary of  the Royal Spanish Academy 
defines ‘territorial’ as ‘of  or relating to a territory’. As these are situations or 
actions linked to migration and to border control, they should conceptually 
be situated outside the territory; therefore, the deterritoriality option hypotheti-
cally makes it possible to encompass the situations of  both the externalization 
and extraterritoriality of  border control functions.64
2. EXTERNALIZATION OF THE MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF MIGRATION FLOWS 
VS EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF BORDER CONTROLS
The literature often notes that some EU and EU Member State border 
control functions are performed by third states using imprecise legal notions, 
such as the ‘delegation’, ‘attribution’ or ‘remote control’ of  the ‘containment 
of  migratory flows’ or directly referring to the outsourcing by the EU of  part 
of  its border control outside its territory.65 Usually, the legal link between the 
Member States/EU and the performance of  these border migration control 
practices by third states is not clear in these analyses.
However, it is very difficult to consider, from a legal perspective, that the 
European states or the EU itself  exercise direct or indirect control over the 
third states’ actions. It is a very hard conclusion to reach based solely on the 
political and legal agreements entered into to date (including the paradigma-
tic case of  the 2016 EU-Turkey deal) or the secondary regulations adopted 
by the EU. Apart from the difficulty of  proving it, from an international law 
perspective, this does not seem to be a case of  international responsibility of  
the European states or the EU itself  for a third state’s migration management 
64 rijPMa and creMona use the term ‘extra-territorialisation’ with a similar content to that 
used here (‘The extra-territorialisation…’, supra note 58). reyes toVar uses it in a different 
context, linked identities in migration, in ‘La Desterritorialización como forma de abordar 
el concepto de frontera y la identidad en la migración’, Revista Geográfica de América Central 
(2011), at 2. naranjo GiralDo conceives of  the deterritorialization of  a border as the per-
formance of  certain border controls outside a state’s territory. See ‘Desterritorialización de 
fronteras y externalización de políticas migratorias. Flujos migratorios irregulares y control 
de las fronteras exteriores en la frontera España-Marruecos’, Estudios Políticos 45, 2014, p. 13. 
65 See, for example, D’huMières, ‘La cooperation Union Européenne/Afrique: l’externalisa-
tion des politiques migratoires européennes’, Fondation Robert Schuman Policy Paper No. 472, 
20 April 2018, at 1.
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conduct (e.g. border control by Tunisia or the return or regularization of  mi-
grants by Morocco). Thus, the Draft Articles on Responsibility of  States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (Part 1, Chapter II, Articles 4-11, ‘Attribution 
of  Conduct to a State’)66 do not seem to apply. Nevertheless, the idea that the 
EU has transferred its responsibility by contracting migration controls out to 
third states is common in the literature and in analyses by organizations and 
NGOs.67 This is inaccurate and does not reflect the international legal reality. 
Given this lack of  definition in the analyses, it might be reasonable to 
differentiate between the concepts of  ‘externalization’ and ‘extraterritoriali-
zation’. Indeed, according to the Dictionary of  the Royal Academy, they are 
clearly distinct situations. Whilst the sole definition of  extraterritorial is ‘to be 
or be considered outside the territory of  jurisdiction’, the first definition of  
externalizar (externalize, outsource), a term taken from economics, is ‘said of  
a company or public institution: to entrust the performance of  internal tasks 
or services to another company’.
First, the externalization of  border control is understood as those situa-
tions in which there is neither the presence nor direct exercise of  control 
activities by public officials of  the Member States. The third states perform 
certain border control and migration policy functions (surveillance of  their 
borders, detention and return of  migrants, regularization processes and re-
sidence permits for migrants) as a direct or indirect consequence of  agree-
ments with the EU or with EU Member States, or according to programmes 
and action plans agreed with the EU or its Member States.
Indeed, it seems more appropriate to classify externalization of  migra-
tion control activities as generic migration flow management or control activities, 
because they have components, activities and purposes that are not strictly 
those of  controlling the entry of  foreigners into the territory through border 
control at checkpoints or borders. This more generic line would encompass 
66 Draft articles on Responsibility of  States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, text adopted by the 
International Law Commission in 2001. See the analysis of  international rules in the vari-
ous scenarios they propose in GaMMeltoFt-hansen and hathaway, ‘Non-Refoulement in 
a World of  Cooperative Deterrence’, Columbia Journal of  Transnational Law  , 53 (2), 2015, p. 
235.
67 See, for example, roDier, ‘Externalisation of  migration controls’, in Shifting Borders – 
Externalising migrant vulnerabilities and rights? Red Cross EU Office, 2013, at 7.
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references to the ‘externalization of  protection responsibilities’.68
It should be recalled that ‘efficient management of  migration flows’ is a 
component of  the common immigration policy (Article 79(1) TFEU), not of  
the border control policy (Article 77 TFEU). In any case, these activities or 
situations aim to keep migrants and refugees in general far from the territory 
of  EU states (even if  they have not been identified and classified as such by 
any agency or European or third-state authority). Therefore, the bias the EU 
has given thus far to the content of  migration flow management consists of  
actions by and in third states to deter and prevent the arrival to EU territory69 
of  certain categories of  foreigners. 
Second, it is necessary to differentiate the foregoing from situations in-
volving the extraterritoriality of  border control functions, restricting this latter 
category to those situations involving the presence of  or performance of  
certain control activities or functions by public officials of  the EU Member 
States in the territory of  third states, with their agreement. In other words, 
extraterritoriality refers to situations involving the direct or indirect exercise 
of  state jurisdiction, applying EU law or the internal law of  an EU state.
The presence of  the public official acting on behalf  of  the EU state or of  
the EU itself  may be the decisive, differential factor for this conceptual diffe-
rence. This presence takes place in a context of  control by the Member State 
of  the migration situation in question, as can be deduced from the ECtHR 
case Hirsi Jamaa.70 In any case, the problems arise with regard to the rights of  
68 See The EU-Turkey Statement and the Greek Hotspots – A Failed European Pilot Project in Refugee 
Policy, The Greens/European Free Alliance – European Parliament, June 2018.
69 The notion of  preventing entry into the jurisdictions of  EU Member States is central 
in some definitions of  the generic concept of  externalization of  migration controls. See 
Frelick, kysel and PoDkuul, ‘The Impact of  Externalisation of  Migration Controls on the 
Rights of  Asylum Seekers and Other Migrants’, Journal of  Migration and Human Security 4(4), 
(2016, p. 190, at 193.
70 Judgment of  the European Court of  Human Rights (ECtHR) (Grand Chamber) Hirsi 
Jamaa and Others v. Italy, No. 27765/09, 23 February 2012. On the issue of  the requirement 
for ‘effective control’ according to ECtHR case law, see McnaMara, ‘Member State Re-
sponsibility…’, supra note 63. On the consequences and unlikely practical application of  this 
judgment in situations of  migration control at sea, see Moreno lax, ‘Hirsi Jamaa and Others v 
Italy or the Strasbourg Court versus Extraterritorial Migration Control?’, 12(3) Human Rights 
Law Review (2012) 574. 
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migrants and refugees in situations outside the territory.71
Other options for establishing criteria for attributing state responsibility 
seem less robust, such as determining whether or not EU law or an EU Mem-
ber State’s law is being applied in the territory of  third states or whether, by 
means of  international responsibility, there exists consent or third-state agen-
cies have been placed at the service of  the EU state or the EU itself.
______________________________________
The proof  that this is an issue that must be explored with resolve from 
a legal perspective can be found in the theoretical confirmation by the EU 
of  new models of  extraterritorial border control. The European Council ac-
cepted the disembarkation of  migrants in third countries as a formula under 
study at its meeting in July 2018. 
This idea of  centres in third states for internment and for the processing 
of  asylum claims is a recurring proposal, like that of  creating a centre in 
North Africa.72 It refers to the creation of  short-term reception centres or 
places, with the aim of  hosting asylum seekers whilst their claims are being 
processed in Europe. It is a possibility that has always been considered to lack 
the minimum European or international legal cover to warrant a feasibility 
assessment, although every so often it is suggested anew in relation to the 
successive migration crises.73 The multipurpose centre in Niger was created 
as a pilot experience for the prospects of  such centres for advising migrants 
and processing any asylum claims that might arise74.
71 See aBrisketa uriarte, ‘La dimensión externa…’, supra note 58, on the scope of  the prin-
ciple of  non-refoulement. sanchez leGiDo, A. “Externalización de controles migratorios…” 
supra note 51. 
72 naïr notes that the creation of  ‘transit processing centres’, essentially offshore holding 
camps in regional protection areas in EU border or neighbouring countries, was proposed as 
early as 2003 (op. cit., at 51-52).
73 See, for example, “Macron wants asylum claims to start in Africa”, Euobserver.com, 29 august 
2017.
74 See Parliamentary question E-008909-15 of  02.06.2015; or the question E-003065-16 
of  26.04.2016, “State of  play of  the pilot multi-purpose centre in Niger”, Answer  given 
by Mr Avramopoulos on behalf  of  the Commission 26.07.2016, <https://www.europarl.
europa.eu/doceo/document//E-8-2016-003065_EN.html>.
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In any case, the question was already posed openly in 2017, following the 
migration and refugee crisis of  2015-2016, and, at its meeting in June 2018, 
the European Council75 formally adopted the proposal to create Regional Di-
sembarkation Platforms in third countries, in collaboration with the UNHCR 
and the International Organization for Migration,76 and Controlled Centres in 
the territory of  EU states77 (the initial term of  ‘closed reception centres” was 
modified).
The feasibility of  these platforms and centres is currently under study.78 
Numerous points need to be clarified regarding fundamental rights, the do-
mestic or international legal status of  these centres and the EU’s responsibi-
75 See González enríquez, ‘The European Council and migration;: any progress? Análisis 
del Real Instituto Elcano, ARI 112/2018, 9 October 2018.
76 Conclusions of  the European Council meeting in Brussels, 28 June 2018, Doc. EUCO 
9/18, Point 5: ‘In that context, the European Council calls on the Council and the 
Commission to swiftly explore the concept of  regional disembarkation platforms, in close 
cooperation with relevant third countries as well as UNHCR and IOM. Such platforms 
should operate distinguishing individual situations, in full respect of  international law and 
without creating a pull factor.’ <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/es/meetings/european-
council/2018/06/28-29/>. Parliamentary Question E-002505-19 of  01.08.2019, about the 
Regional Disembarkation platforms. 
77 Point 6: ‘On EU territory, those who are saved, according to international law, should be 
taken charge of, on the basis of  a shared effort, through the transfer in controlled centres 
set up in Member States, only on a voluntary basis, where rapid and secure processing would 
allow, with full EU support, to distinguish between irregular migrants, who will be returned, 
and those in need of  international protection, for whom the principle of  solidarity would 
apply. All the measures in the context of  these controlled centres, including relocation and 
resettlement, will be on a voluntary basis, without prejudice to the Dublin reform.’
78 See the Non-papers and Follow-ups to the European Council Conclusions of  28 June 
2018 ‘Non-paper on “controlled centres” in the EU’, ‘Non-paper on regional disembarka-
tion arrangements’, ‘Factsheet on “controlled centres” in the EU’ and ‘Factsheet on region-
al disembarkation arrangements’ in Managing migration: Commission expands on disembarkation 
and controlled centre concepts, 24 July 2018, IP/18/4629, available at <http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_IP-18-4629_en.htm>. More recently, European Council Working Document on 
Guidelines on temporary arrangements for disembarkation, WK 7219/2019 INIT, 12.06.2019.
See the analysis of  carrera S. – cortinoVis R. “Search and Rescue, disembarkation and 
relocation arrangements in the Mediterranean- Sailing away from Responsibility?” CEPS 
Paper nº 2019-10, June 2019; and  künnecke, A. “Legal challenges and the practicability of  
disembarkation centres for illegal migrants outside the EU”, Análisis del Real Instituto Elcano 
ARI 53/2019, 16.05.2019.
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lity at them in light of  the involvement of  public officials from the Member 
States, of  civil servants and public officials of  the EU, or of  civil servants of  
other international organizations.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The refugee crisis has shaped a new perception of  the migration reality in 
Europe. The ramifications of  its impact on European integration are visible 
and enduring.
The EU’s response has included a certain strategic perspective, albeit wei-
ghed down by an excess of  eurocentrism and a security perception that does 
not take third countries’ interests into balanced account. The major econo-
mic effort being made supports a far-reaching strategy, only now beginning 
to be outlined, to promote economic development in the countries of  origin 
and transit of  migrants. Additionally, issues such as the monitoring of  respect 
for migrants’ human rights have not yet been suitably globally defined in this 
strategy.
Although the behaviour and response capacity of  the EU and its Member 
States can be assessed in different ways, the truth is that the migration debate 
has decisively swayed a block of  countries that are openly reluctant to engage 
in intra-European solidarity and accept the new realities and burdens entailed 
by the refugees already present and yet to come to Europe. This position is 
very negative in the medium and long term, since, as noted, the crisis has also 
underscored the permanence of  migration trends and flows and the consoli-
dation of  the routes or gates of  entry to Europe.
This article has considered the vulnerability of  the European borders de-
signed and in operation in the Schengen Area. The internal borders were the 
most affected at the start of  the migration crisis and are likely to be marked 
by current regulatory changes, which tend to allow exceptionality as a relati-
vely common occurrence in the European ‘federal’ area of  free movement. 
Nevertheless, the resilience of  this system of  the absence of  internal border 
controls in the ‘federal’ area of  free movement is undeniable.
The impact on the EU’s external borders has been even greater, as, in the 
author’s view, it has shown once and for all that, more than fragile or vulne-
rable, some border controls, such as the sea border ones, are not practicable, 
especially those on Europe’s southern sea borders.
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It is precisely this infeasibility of  border control in marine areas that, in 
the author’s view, leads to the accentuation of  certain trends on Europe’s 
external borders, such as the externalization of  migration controls. New re-
gulatory and strategic planning developments confirm this trend, as well as 
the current concern for deploying an integrated external border management 
system79.
With regard to the phenomenon known as the ‘externalization’ of  migra-
tion controls, the literature considers it to refer to EU actions aimed at redu-
cing, sorting and controlling migration flows with the consent of  third states 
in relations that are, by definition, asymmetrical.80 This article has addressed 
the different situations that arise, highlighting the advisability of  differentia-
ting between externalizing migration policy, on the one hand, and extraterritorial 
action concerning migration control, on the other.
In search of  greater conceptual accuracy, the term deterritoriality has been 
used, as it is more neutral than the other terms mentioned insofar as it evokes 
the idea of  positioning outside the territory certain border control and mi-
gration policy functions, to be carried out by other states or by the EU state 
itself. Since these are situations and actions linked to migration and border 
control, they should be conceptually situated outside the territory; the de-
territoriality option hypothetically makes it possible to encompass both the 
externalization and the extraterritoriality of  border control functions concerning 
migration.
To this end, this article has focused on the various notions and activities 
that might be discussed in relation to the ‘externalization’ and the ‘extraterri-
toriality’ of  migration controls and border functions, terms that, in sum, refer 
to migration control and management activities outside the territory, carried 
out by public officials of  the EU states or by third states.
On the one hand, externalization is considered to refer to the management 
and control of  migration flows, the activities of  adopting agreements, pro-
grammes, action plans and measures to encourage third states to monitor 
their own borders and migration flows in order to control, restrict or impede 
79 See caMPesi G., “Crisis, migration and the consolidation of  the EU border control re-
gime”, International Journal of  Migration and Border Studies, vol. 4, nº 3, 2018, at 196.
80 zaPata-Barrero, ‘La dimensión exterior de las políticas migratorias en el área mediterrá-
nea: premisas para un debate normativo’, Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos nº 
2, 2013, at 32 and 9.
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physical access to the territory of  the EU states, accepting the placement in 
their territory, or the rejection, of  refugees and migrants from other states. 
It does not involve the presence of  or direct exercise of  control activities by 
public officials of  the EU Member States. In fact, outside European territory 
it is highly debatable that states are strictly performing border control func-
tions, as it is an area that may more accurately fall within the more generic 
field of  migration flow control linked to migration policy and European external 
action.
On the other hand, extraterritorialization is understood to entail the perfor-
mance of  border control functions by states themselves outside their own 
territory. In the author’s view, this case should involve the presence of  or 
exercise by Member State public officials of  some (effective) border control 
activities or functions in areas without state jurisdiction or in the territory of  
third states, with their consent.
We are witnessing a change in the very concept of  border in this post-glo-
balization era, in which certain functions are offshored and systematically 
placed outside a state’s territory and checkpoints. However, territorial and 
extraterritorial actions must be differentiated from those occurring as part of  
external actions in or with third states for the purposes of  migration policy 
and the control of  migration flows.
The reality is that a new border space south and east of  the Mediterra-
nean has been configured for migratory flows, which needs a new policy of  
external borders for these areas. Therefore, we must reflect on new frontier 
spaces, with new concepts and approaches to the border that provide other 
parameters of  action towards migratory flows and external controls. The 
treatment of  migrations in the Mediterranean actually refers to large and me-
dium-term strategies (as shown in the European Agenda on Migration and 
the ‘New Partnership Framework’). So any adaptation or new model of  bor-
ders towards the Mediterranean-Sahel area must include internal measures 
to the EU (integrated management system of  external borders; a common 
asylum, refugees and temporary protection policy with major reforms in the 
Dublin system81); but also external measures, with a migration policy and a 
management of  migratory flows that integrates third States in the adapted 
81 See Di FiliPPo, M. “The allocation of  competence in asylum procedures under EU law: 
The need to take the Dublin bull by the horns”, Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo, 59, 
2018, 41-95.
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new model of  borders. Naturally, such a model demands a close connection 
to the CFSP, but also to the development of  the legal statutes of  Citizens and 
Aliens in the Union, and to the capital issue of  creating a stable system of  
legal routes of  immigration to Europe.
Today, the Union needs new instruments and concepts for these new 
realities, especially so as not to lose sight of  the fact that, when it comes to 
tackling crises such as those related to migration and the rights of  foreigners 
approaching or entering its territory and jurisdiction, Europe is a rational 
construct entailing a project for civilizational progress. As such, it must per-
manently incorporate its values and respect for human rights in all its policies, 
regulatory measures and actions with foreigners and third states, both on its 
own external borders and beyond them. This is essential for the identity and 
objectives of  the European integration, and for the projection of  the EU 
security, solidarity and values in accordance with the International and Euro-
pean Human Rights Law.
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